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Abstract
Purpose – The unhealthy drive for deposit in the banking sector has pushed many banks into unethical
practices, thereby resulting in high-level corruption cases in the banking sector. The purpose of this study is
to investigate the short- and long-run linkages between bank net interest income and deposit liabilities
interacted with corruption, to establish the influence of corruption in deposit mobilisation drive of banks in
Nigeria. Also, the study analysed the causal relationship between selected bank variables and fraud.
Design/methodology/approach – The study used quarterly data on selected variables from 1Q 1993 to
4Q 2017 sourced from Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) annual reports and Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin of various issues. Deposit Money Bank various deposit liabilities are
interacted with a corruption index and used as the independent variables, while bank earnings serve as the
dependent variable. Error Correction Model (ECM) and Engel Granger approach to co-integration technique
were used to analyse the data.
Findings – The findings reveal that various bank deposit liabilities interacted with corruption index has a
negative effect on bank profitability in the long run, though only corrupt fixed deposit is statistically
significant at the 5 per cent significance level. Bank total asset, total loan and advances and fraud have a
significant effect on bank profitability at 1 and 10 per cent significance level. The findings also reveal that
banks profit from corrupt fixed deposit and demand deposit in the short run.
Social implications – Text
Originality/value – The literature is awash with bank lending corruption and various institutional factors
such as competition among banks, credit bureau and information sharing about borrowers, bank supervisory
policies, loan loss provisioning, bank ownership structure and regulatory environment and anti-corruption
measures. The aspect of deposit mobilisation and corruption has not been well researched in literature; this
study, therefore, fills the gap in the literature by examining the extent deposit money banks contributed to
corruption in Nigeria through their cutthroat deposit mobilisation drive.
Keywords Bank fraud, Challenges of accountability, Demand deposit corruption,
Deposit money bank, Savings deposit corruption, Term deposit corruption
Paper type Research paper
© Abiola Ayopo Babajide, Adedoyin Isola Lawal, Lanre Olaolu Amodum, Abiola John Asaleye,
Olabanji Olukayode Ewetan, Felicia Omowunmi Olokoyo and Oluwatoyin Augustina Matthew.
Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative
works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to





Journal of Money Laundering
Control





The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/1368-5201.htm
1. Introduction
Transparency international in 2018 reported that the global average score for corruption is
barely 43 per cent, indicating endemic corruption in most countries in the world resulting in
a vicious circle of poverty, unequal distribution of wealth and power and denial of
fundamental human right. People living in highly corrupt countries are faced continuously
with extortion and bribery, dilapidated public infrastructure, injustice with attendant
inability to seek redress in the law court to mention a few. World Bank, in 2017, reported
that businesses and individuals pay a significant amount as bribe each year estimated to
about 2 per cent of total world gross domestic product (GDP) and ten times the value of
Oversea Development Assistance (ODA). The negative impact of corruption on the global
economy far outweighs the estimated cash volume with an attendant consequence on
economic growth and development (Jiang et al., 2018). Issues of corruption are not only
prevalent in low-income countries; they cut across all the regions of the world, but their
severity is felt most in low-income developing nation where corrupt government official
trample on people fundamental right with impunity.
Okereke and Kurotamunobaraomi (2016) opine that corruption in the public sector of the
economy has a direct reflection on the private sector as a result of the policies, actions,
activities and corruption tolerance level in public office. There are several corporate fraud
cases in Nigeria. The banking sector is not insulated against it, as it often serves as a conduit
pipe for a public officer to perpetuate corruption in Nigeria.
Banking institution exists to carry out financial intermediation in the society, among
other functions (Amodu et al., 2018). As a vital component of the financial system, banks
play an essential role in the economy of a nation by allocating funds most efficiently from a
surplus unit to the deficit unit of the economy. They provide specialised financial services
that help in reducing the cost of information for both savers and borrowers, which results in
inefficiency in the economy. Banks operate and remain in business by giving out a loan and
earning interest on the investment. They accept deposits from individual, institutions
and government and also give credit to individuals, businesses, financial institutions and
governments with surplus funds (savings). Deposits and borrowed funds (liabilities of the
bank) are also used to purchase securities (assets of the bank), while interest rates adopted
by the monetary committee signal the price for borrowers, lenders and banks.
Financial intermediation implies the ability of the bank to mobilise funds from the
surplus unit and channel it to the deficit unit for investment and development of the society.
Savings mobilisation is one of the core functions of the bank; in fact, it is where the bank–
customer relationship starts. Bank evolves the different financial product to mobilise fund
from members of the society. In a typical commercial banking system, banks develop
financial products such as demand deposit, time deposit and savings deposit product. Funds
mobilise are channelled through the lending process to other bank customers who need
capital to run their businesses. These categories of customers pay back the funds borrowed
with interest, which constitute the main business of the bank in the society.
The need to mobilise funds for banking operations and maximising profit has pushed
many banks into several unethical practices, thereby resulting in corruption in the banking
sector. Corruption in Nigeria Deposit Money Banks is perceptible in three facades. First, by
the employees of the bank who circumvent the rules and regulation of the bank to enjoy
private gain at the expense of the stakeholders (Azelewa, 2002). Then, at the institutional
level where corruption is instigated and condoned by management to achieve a pre-
established objective, mostly associated with fraudulent accounting reporting (Section 40,
EFCC, 2004). Finally, systemic corruption, where inter-bank collusion and acts contravene




banking system was reported to lack a sound corporate governance structure resulting in
unethical banking practices ranging from having large volumes of toxic assets, cronyism,
insider dealings and weak board oversight. This led to the dissolution of the Board of
directors of five deposit money banks and injection of NGN620bn (US$4.1bn) to revitalise
the banks (Babajide et al., 2013).
The truth is that banks play an integral role in enabling corruption to thrive. Corrupt
officials need somewhere to hide stolen money, and the banks provide a haven when they do
not probe every suspicious deposit. Laws and regulations applied in most countries in the
world are based on internationally agreed standards, which require banks to carry out
appropriate checks to detect the proceeds of corruption and other crimes, as well as money
intended for terrorist groups. However, many banks across the world do not comply with
these laws: some of the banks turn a blind eye when suspicious funds are being laundered,
some intentionally accept such funds for private gains while some as a result of weakness in
their internal control enable illegal transactions to continue. Magu (2016) opines that the
banks in Nigeria are creating enabling environment for looters of public fund. According to
him:
[. . .] it is as if the banks are aiding the looter by providing an enabling environment for them to
hide the stolen funds, thereby allowing corruption to thrive in the country (Magu, 2016).
The truth is that many banks leave their door wide open for corrupt individuals to launder
their funds.
When banks do not attend to their duties with a sense of responsibility in probing
suspicious funds, they may end up handling money for drug cartels, human traffickers,
arms dealers, fraudsters and other dangerous criminals. These banks end up giving these
funds a veneer of legitimacy that they otherwise would not have and leaving the criminals
free to perpetrate their crimes undetected, thereby creating innumerable victims around the
world, especially in developing countries. In 2015, Global Witness reported how one of the
biggest banks in the world, HSBC Switzerland enabled tax evasion on a large scale, handled
proceeds of drug trafficking and illusions crime, breaking laws and ignored the risk of
terrorism financing. BNP Paribus, a French bank, pleaded guilty in 2014 to knowingly and
willfully break US laws concerning funds originating from Sudan, Iran and Cuba. Evidence
levied against the bank shows that the senior executives of the bank ignored several
warnings from the compliance staff on transactions involving Sudanese customers suspects
connected to the Darfur genocide and harbouring Osama Bin Laden account. This was not
the first time the bank was being indicted; in 2004, the same bank was sanctioned for failure
to comply with money laundering laws and was forced to sign a memorandum of
understanding (Global witness, 2015).
The financial services sector corruption can have profound and enormous implication for
an economy, and because of global integration, its consequence on the global economy is
more damming. This has become very glaring after the 2008 financial crisis, as some banks
were found to be pervasive in money laundering, interest rate rigging and tax evasion not
only for themselves but for their clients also (Bhat and Ginodia, 2018).
Even though the lack of accountability and transparency are contributory factors to
many social-economic ills in our society, mainly through banks, it has not been given
adequate attention in economic literature; hence, appropriate solutions in tackling it has not
been proffered. The literature is awash with bank lending corruption and various
institutional factors such as competition among banks, credit bureau and information
sharing about borrowers, bank supervisory policies, loan loss provisioning, bank ownership




mobilisation and corruption has not been well researched in literature; this study, therefore,
fills the gap in the literature by examining the extent deposit money banks contributed to
corruption in Nigeria through their cutthroat deposit mobilisation drive. The remaining part
of the paper is divided into four sections. Following the introduction is the theoretical
framework and literature review in Section 2, the methodology used is discussed in Section
3, result and discussion are presented in Section 4,while summary, conclusion and policy
implication are presented in Section 5.
2. Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework for this paper is based on the financial intermediation theory and
production theory, which appropriately explain the input and output services provided by
banks. The former posits that banks transform deposit portfolio into a loan (credit) portfolio
(Baltensperger, 1980; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Osuagwu and Nwokoma, 2017). The
latter approach conceptualises deposits as input and loans as output (Resti, 1997; Matthews
and Thompson, 2008; Osuagwu and Nwokoma, 2017). The classical proposition on banking
is that banks are financial intermediaries that intermediate funds between surplus units or
lenders and deficit units or borrowers (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Osuagwu and
Nwokoma, 2017). Traditional theories of financial intermediation and current financial
intermediation theory are based on the idea that financial intermediaries serve to reduce
transaction costs and informational asymmetries. Contemporary financial intermediation
theory posits that developments in information technology, deregulation, deepening of
financial markets and so on have contributed to a reduction in transaction costs and
informational asymmetries.
Financial intermediaries assist the efficient functioning of markets, and any factor that
affects the amount of credit channelled through financial intermediaries can significantly
affect macroeconomic variables. There are two schools of thought in the literature that
formally explain the existence of financial intermediaries. The first strand emphasises
financial intermediaries’ provision of liquidity. The second strand focuses on financial
intermediaries’ ability to transform the risk characteristics of assets. In both cases, financial
intermediation can reduce the cost of channelling funds between borrowers and lenders,
leading to an efficient allocation of resources and improved liquidity of assets (Iris and
Grimes, 2003). The illiquidity of assets provides both the rationale for the existence of banks
and their vulnerability to runs (Diamond and Philip, 1983). A shift in expectations causes a
bank run.
The modern theory of financial intermediation focuses on the functions of financial
intermediaries, the way in which the financial intermediaries influence the economy on the
whole and the effects of government policies on financial intermediaries. Gorton andWinton
(2003) affirm that it would be hard to distinguish between banks and other types of financial
intermediaries, as banks offer other financial services such as insurance, brokerage and
investment, in addition to their deposit and credit functions.
2.1 Literature review
The plague of corruption is a global phenomenon, which if not timely and collectively
addressed, can have a shattering effect on the global economy. It can destroy public trust,
undermine the rule of law, skew competition, impede cross-border investment and trade and
distort resource allocation (G20, 2015). It is the responsibility of the world leaders to stand
together to fight this monster before it destroys the world economy. Global Witness in 2009
published a report highlighting undue diligence of the world’s largest bank in facilitating




corruption in developing countries is limited to not only public officials taking bribe but also
wholesome stealing of state assets and illicit capital flight out of developing countries. This
is made possible as a result of loopholes in the international financial system and the
cooperation of financial institutions in the developed world that create opportunities for
illegal money transfer, thereby undermining the international effort at eliminating poverty.
Bhat and Ginodia (2018) posit that with the increasing interconnectedness of the global
economy, ignoring corruption in the financial service industry can have a profound and far-
reaching consequence on the world economy as observed in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis
as evidence of interest rate rigging, money laundering and tax evasion are found in many of
the big banks by regulators. To help policy-makers and other stakeholders to understand
transmission mechanism of corruption into the financial industry, G20 (2015) identified the
critical role of a financial institution in stemming the wave of corruption in a country. This
they can do by identifying politically exposed persons (PEPs) among their prospective
investors and clients and apply enhanced due diligence to double-check every transaction by
such people and be sure which one is legitimate. Many banks often fail to carry out due
diligence but continue to provide the corrupt individual with a place to hide their money. A
report by the UK’s financial regulator by Transparency International in 2011 shows that
more than a third of the banks inspected in that year lacked effective means to identify bank
clients as PEPs and over half of them did not meaningfully apply measures to enhanced due
diligence in high-risk situations (Transparency International, 2015). Global Witness (2015)
attest to the fact that many banks aid and abet criminal behaviour. Many violate the laws
designed to stop them from taking ill-gotten gains, which in turn are not adequately
enforced by regulators.
In some countries, legal loopholes mean it can be possible for banks to handle ill-gotten
gains without technically breaking any rules. Ribadu (2015) declared that the Nigerian
banking system is prone to corruption and not wholly safe from abuses, despite several
policies by the government such as the introduction of BVN and report of individual and
corporate cash lodgments and transfers that exceed prescribed limits by the Central Bank of
Nigeria. Abuses in the system and financial infractions occur with the involvement of banks
and bankers. Emefiele (2017) said there is a need for governments and institutions around
the world to take the issue of the flow of capital and funds more seriously. Proceeds of crime,
which he called dirty money, should not find their way into the banking sector, and it is time
for governments to take this more seriously because failure to do this is destructive in the
society. Leaders must be prepared to do everything possible to combat crime and corruption,
particularly money laundering because of its grave implication (Shehu, 2005).
Larmode (2012) enumerates how banks and bank officials aid corruption in the country
and shield persons suspected of financial crime. Some of the bank’s actions range from non-
compliance with Know-Your-Customer (KYC) principles, doctoring/non-disclosure of correct
position of customer’s statement of account, lowing secrecy surrounding private banking,
ignoring suspected money laundering and refusal to check and monitor politically exposed
person account. Such unethical practices undermine the economic development of a country,
and unfortunately, almost all Nigerian banks are involved. Some banks in the country
allegedly helped in concealing stolen money; Magu (2016) vowed that banks and their
officials who helped in concealing stolen public funds would soon face trial. Unfortunately,
while Magu’s stand is laudable, judicial technicalities and ineptitude have made it very
difficult for the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) to secure timely
convictions in many of the bank corruption cases. Barth et al. (2016) assert that a well-
functioning banking system can help reduce poverty and income inequality, but banking




are characterized by weak institution and judicial system, inadequate laws and fragile
supervisory and regulatory environment which will not be able to contain corruption. The
banking system in such a situation will not be able to perform its primary function of
efficient allocation of scarce resources.
2.2 Empirical review
Barry et al. (2016) examined the influence of bank ownership structure, regulatory
environment and economic development on bank lending corruption. The findings revealed
that corruption was higher when a state-owned bank or family-owned bank provided a
higher proportion of credit to the economy. Also, the stronger regulatory environment was
effective in the case of family-owned bank-induced corruption but not sufficient for state-
owned bank-induced corruption. Jiang et al. (2018) examined the influence of lending
corruption on bank loan contracting using World Bank business environment survey. They
found that the bank gave favourable loan term to borrowers with higher financial
constraints in countries with more lending corruption. They also found that participating
banks were less willing to lend more in loan syndication market in countries where lending
corruption is high and firms preferred private bank lending to public bond, and they were
more indebted. Banks in such countries have poor asset quality, worse earning performance
and are prone to high bank failure.
In another study, Sun et al. (2018) investigated the effect of the anti-corruption measure
on bank lending decision to state- and non-state-owned enterprises in China, using micro-
level lending data from one of the largest state-owned bank. They found that state-owned
enterprises receive favourable borrowing terms than non-state-owned before the anti-
corruption campaign, but after the campaign, non-state-owned enterprises received more
favourable borrowing terms with a lower interest rate, longer duration and more substantial
credit amount. Qi and Ongena (2019) examined limiting access to bank credit as a result of
corruption on firm growth, using a firm-level measure covering 12,006 firms across 22
transition economies. The findings show that supply-side rather than demand-side factors
mainly drive the detrimental impact and that the loss of access is more severe where there is
a limited foreign bank in the vicinity of the firm and when the competition is very low or
very high in the local banking market. Financing constraint as a result of corruption
significantly constrained future firm growth. Okereke and Kurotamunobaraomi (2016)
concluded that corruption in deposit money bank in Nigeria does not significantly impede
Nigeria’s economic growth, while Arshad and Rizvi’s (2013) research established that
corruption has a significant positive impact on the bank’s profitability, lending credence to
the fact that banks are thriving from corruption in Malaysia.
2.3 Choice of variables and data source
Data description and source are presented in Table I. The study used quarterly data on
selected variables from 1Q 1993 to 4Q 2017 sourced from Nigerian Deposit Insurance
Corporation (NDIC) annual reports and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin of
various issues. The study used the net interest income (NII) as a proxy for bank profitability.
The study argues that as the banking institution core business is financial intermediation,
NII which is the difference between interest generated from bank assets (such as
commercial, mortgage and personal loan) and interest paid on interest-bearing liabilities
(such as deposit liabilities) is the most appropriate proxy for bank profitability; this is the
dependent variable.
Deposit money bank’s various deposit liabilities are interacted with a corruption index




deposit, fixed deposit and demand deposit. Other independent variables are bank asset,
bank total loan and advances and the total amount of fraud. All the variables and the apriori
expectation are presented in Table I.
2.4 Model and estimation techniques
The purpose of this study is to establish the relationship between bank profitability and





S/No. Variable Abbreviation Data description and sources Apriori
1. Net interest
income
NII Net interest income is the difference in income between
the revenue generated from a bank’s assets and the
expenses related to paying its liabilities. Data Source:
NDIC Annual Reports
2. Bank total asset BTA Bank total asset is the combined bank total fixed asset






COR_SD Savings deposit are deposit account held with a
financial institution that pays interest and does not
allow for direct withdrawal through cheques. Interest
is usually paid to the depositors at the end of the
month provided withdrawal limit is not exceeded.
When interacted with corruption, it becomes a savings
deposit acquire through corrupt means. Source: CBN






COR_DD A demand deposit is a bank account with a bank or
other financial institution that allows the depositor to
withdraw from the account without warning or with
less than seven days’ notice. A demand deposit is a
vital component of the M1 money supply. Interacted
with a corruption index implies demand deposit
acquired through corrupt means. Source: CBN






COR_FD A fixed deposit account is an interest-bearing bank
account that has a fixed date of maturity, the funds
available in these accounts must be held for a fixed
term with a clause that the depositor withdraws from
the account only by giving prior notice. Failure to
adhere to the conditions attract penalties on the part of
the depositor for early withdrawal. Source: CBN
Statistical Bulletin and Transparency International
report, various issues
_
6. Bank loan and
advances
FSGLA Bank total loan and advances to deposit money bank.




TFA Total fraud amount in the banking sector. Source:
NDIC annual report, various issues
_





 First, the study investigates the short and long-run linkages between bank NII and
deposit liabilities interacted with corruption, to establish the influence of corruption
in deposit mobilisation drive of banks on earnings.
 Second, it analyses the causal relationship between selected bank indicators and
fraud.
Themodel in the implicit form:
NII ¼ f BTA;COR_DD;COR_SD;COR_FD;BTLA;TFAð Þ (1)
NII = banks net interest income;
BTA = banks total asset;
COR_DD= banks corrupt demand deposit;
COR_SD = banks corrupt savings deposit;
COR_FD = banks corrupt fixed deposit;
BTLA = bank total loan and advance; and
TFA = total amount of fraud in the banking sector.
Themodel is an explicit form can be written as
NIIt ¼ a0 þ a1TAþ a2COR_DDþ a3COR_SDþ a4COR_FD
þa5BTLAþ a6TFAþ « t (2)
To estimate the Error Correction Model (ECM) or Engel Granger approach to co-integration,
the unit root is carried out for the series using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller approach; the
equation is given as:
DZt ¼ d Zt1 þ
Xn
i¼1
f iDZti þ m t (3)
If the series is not stationary at level form, then it could be stationary at the first difference
form. If the series are integrated of the same order, then it is the tendency of long-run
relationship (Engle and Granger, 1987; Asaleye et al., 2018). Equation (2) is then estimated
using the least square technique. The null hypothesis of no presence of co-integration is
further tested. In the presence of co-integration, the estimated equation will be super
consistent and gives the long-run behaviour. Rewriting equation (2) as:
NIIt ¼ a0 þ a1Kt þ « t (4)
In equation (4), Kt represents the independent variables (BTA, COR_DD, COR_SD,
COR_FD, BTLA and TFA). The ECM relates the change in one variable to past equilibrium
errors and the previous changes in the variables. Therefore, the ECM is given as:
DNIIt ¼ b 1 þ DKt  cRt1 þ t (5)
In equation (5), Rt ¼ NIIt  a0 þ a1Kð Þ refers to the “disequilibrium error correction term.”
The long-run term is assumed to be zero; however, if there is derivation in the long run, then
it will be non-zero. The coefficient c is the error correction term, which measures the speed




correlation and descriptive analysis. Further, the study carried out causality to determine
the direction of causality using Granger approach.
3. Results
Table II presents the correlation analysis of the series used in this study, which shows the
pair relationship between the series. The emphasis is on the dependent variable (NII). It can
be depicted from the result that there is a weak negative relationship between bank NII and
BTA, COR_DD, COR_SD, COR_FD and TFA with –0.13561, –0.44423, –0.39961, –0.49974
and –0.26997, respectively. However, a positive correlation with bank total loan advances
with the value of 0.29066.
Table III presents the descriptive statistics of the series. The total NII has the highest
mean, then followed by corrupt fixed deposit (COR_FD), corrupt demand deposit (COR_DD),
bank total asset (BTA), corrupt savings deposit (COR_SD), Bank Total Loan and Advances
(BTLA) and the total amount of fraud (TFA). Likewise, NII has the highest standard
deviation, and BTA has the lowest standard deviation. All the series are positively skewed.
The unit test is carried out using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller approach, as presented
in Table IV. All the series are not stationary at 5 per cent significant level; however, they are
integrated of order 1. Based on the outcome of the unit root result, the study proceeds to
estimate the Engel Granger approach for co-integration. First, the long-run form of the
equation is estimated using the least square technique in which the residual is generated.




Series NII BTA COR_DD COR_SD COR_FD BTLA TFA
NII 1
BTA 0.13561 1
COR_DD 0.44423 0.030057 1
COR_SD 0.39962 0.016184 0.35336 1
COR_FD 0.49974 0.14380 0.60800 0.55130 1
BTLA 0.29066 0.209106 0.42725 0.383105 0.58526 1
TFA 0.26997 0.22671 0.59201 0.51581 0.470660 0.26543 1
Source:Authors’ Computation using e-views 10
Table III.
Descriptive statistics
NII TA COR_DD COR_SD COR_FD BTLA FA
Mean 18,224,557 27,476.52 3,560,166 1,091,917 15,690,061 142,088.7 12,441.44
Median 785.2278 21,912.19 1,187,804. 367,420.0 1,054.859 14,539.71 10,006.07
Maximum 1.39Eþ08 100,812.5 11,033,318 3,963,874 67,487,917 1,019,047 43,352.61
Minimum 19,651,190 12,351.20 47,071.80 2,536.488 9,176,873 139,473.0 760.0372
SD 33,315,429 24,657.23 3,977,946 1,285,729. 21,492,591 248,348.3 9,757.480
Skewness 2.045196 1.013329 0.742521 1.072542 0.879827 2.088761 1.290283
Kurtosis 6.602537 3.482535 1.920661 2.731058 2.248491 6.495826 4.233537
Sum 1.82Eþ09 2,747,652 3.56Eþ08 1.09Eþ08 1.57Eþ09 14,208,873 1,244,144
Sum Sq. Dev. 1.10Eþ17 6.02Eþ10 1.57Eþ15 1.64Eþ14 4.57Eþ16 6.11Eþ12 9.43Eþ09
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100




Table V presents the long-run relationship using the “Bank Net Interest Income” as the
dependent variable. The Durbin–Watson (DW) statistics helps to detect autocorrelation;
region closer to 2 shows no autocorrelation. The statistics value of the DW is 1.838797, which
is closer to 2. The R-squared and the adjusted R-squared measure the goodness of fit. It is
depicted from both the adjusted R-squared and the R-squared with the values of 0.78796 and
0.887972, respectively, that is more than 70 per cent variations in the dependent variables are
explained by the independent variables. The F-statistics measures the joint significance of
the independent. With a probability value less than 0.01, the independent variables jointly
explained the dependent variable at 1 per cent significance level. The total bank asset (BTA)
and bank total loan and advances (BTLA) are statistically significant at the level of 1 per
cent. While fixed deposit (COR_FD) and the total fraud amount (TFA) are statistically
significant at 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The corrupt demand deposit (COR_DD) and
corrupt savings deposit (COR_SD) are not statistically significant. The variables BTA, TFA
and BTL, have a significant positive relationship with NII; this means an increase in one unit
of each of the variables, holding other constant will result to positive change in the dependent
variable (NII) in the long run. However, there is a negative relationship between NII and
COR_FD; this shows that an increase in COR_FD has a negative long-run implication on NII.
Table VI presents the result of the stationary test of the residual generated from the least
square estimation. The Augmented Dickey–Fuller test statistic is –3.907066 and the critical
Table IV.
Unit root test
Series Level First diff Order Level First diff Order
NII 0.332345 3.149507 I (1) 2.102763 5.389468 I(1)
BTA 2.210202 2.894601 I (1) 1.953952 5.435146 I(1)
COR_DD 0.277300 5.674088 I (1) 0.371592 5.866196 I(1)
COR_SD 0.621247 3.011650 I (1) 1.227715 5.966308 I(1)
COR_FD 1.619510 3.372943 I (1) 1.419385 5.247553 I(1)
BTLA 2.075040 2.983517 I (1) 0.265256 5.179855 I(1)
TFA 1.870171 2.995616 I (1) 2.391303 6.231947 I(1)




Using NII as the dependent variable
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability
BTA 138.1812* 25.88969 5.337306 0.0000
COR_DD 0.114713 0.354365 0.323713 0.7469
COR_SD 0.873355 1.016196 0.859436 0.3923
COR_FD 0.177996** 0.074489 2.389565 0.0480
BTLA 142.1963* 5.755901 24.70443 0.0000
TFA 97.76176*** 51.77117 1.888343 0.0621
C 4006911.0* 1030908. 3.886779 0.0002
R2 0.887972 Durbin–Watson stat 1.838797








values are as follows: –3.504727, –2.893956 and –2.584126 for 1, 5 and 10 per cent,
respectively. The probability value is 0.0030, which is less than 0.05. Hence, the residual is
stationary at 5 per cent significance level. This shows the presence of co-integration among
the series.
Table VII presents the short-run dynamics; the series is in first difference form and one
lag period of the residual is indicated by ECT (–1) referred to as the error correction. The
error correction termmeasures the speed of adjustment. Theoretically, it must be less than 1,
negative and statistically significant to validate the presence of long-run relationship among
the series. The coefficient of the error correction term is –0.078272, and it is statistically
significant at the 5 per cent level. The indication of this result shows that the system will
adjust to equilibrium at the speed of about 8 per cent per annum. The variables BTA,
COR_TD, BTLA and TFA are statistically significant at 1 per cent, while COR_DD is
statistically significant at 5 per cent significance level. The variables BTA, COR_DD,
COR_FD and BTLA have a positive short-run relationship with the dependent variable.
Holding all other variables constant, an increase of one unit will lead to an increase in the
dependent variable. The variable COR_SD is not statistically significant, while there is a
negative short-run relationship between NII and TFA.
Table VIII present the diagnostic checks using the Histogram normality test, Breusch–
Godfrey LM Test and ARCH to check for normality, serial correction and equal variance of




Null hypothesis: ECT has a unit root
Exogenous: constant
Lag length: 9 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag = 12)
t-statistic Prob.*








Using D(NII) as the dependent variable
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Prob.
D(BTA) 117.7690* 20.09481 5.860671 0.0000
D(COR_DD) 1.172145** 0.394650 2.970087 0.0389
D(COR_SD) 1.265662 1.147496 1.102978 0.2729
D(COR_FD) 0.305801* 0.098221 3.113390 0.0025
D(BTLA) 123.5837* 6.204006 19.91999 0.0000
D(TFA) 6.666734* 1.408940 4.731737 0.0050
ECT(1) 0.078272** 0.034693 2.25613 0.0424
C 180673.0 135725.2 1.331168 0.1865




probability value of 0.18188, which is not statistically significant at the 5 per cent
significance level. Hence, the null hypothesis that the errors are not normally distributed
cannot be accepted. Also, the value of the observed R-squared statistics is 81.64770 with a
probability value of 0.87421, which is not statistically significant and resulted to the
rejection of the null hypothesis that there is a serial correlation among the residual. Finally,
the value of the ARCH statistics is 79.62750 with a probability value of 0.42518; the null
hypothesis that the model does not have equal error variance is rejected. Given the outcome
of the diagnostic checks, it was concluded that the model is correctly specified.
Table IX presents the pairwise causality result. Evidence from the result shows no
causality for most of the series except for corrupt fixed deposit (COR_FD) and NII; bank
total loan advances (BTLA) and NII; corrupt savings deposit (COR_SD) and corrupt demand
deposit (DD) in which there is a bi-directional relationship.
3.1 Implications of findings
The research outcomes from the study adequately address the research questions and
objectives set. The study set out to establish the role of deposit money banks and the
challenges of accountability and development in Nigeria. In specific terms, it analysed
the impact of corrupt deposit liabilities on the long-term and short-term profitability of the
banks. The findings have several significant implications for policy-makers, regulators, the
banking institutions, academicians and researchers in the study area.
The consequences of corruption in an economy are more devastating, particularly in a
developing economy. The disposition of the banks, in aiding and abetting corrupt
government officials to steal public funds and providing a haven for them to hide their illicit
fund or legalise the proceed of corruption because of their drive for profit is the motivation
for this study. Previous studies have examined bank lending corruption and various
dimension and consequences (Barth et al., 2016; Barry et al., 2016; and Jiang et al., 2018). The
uniqueness of this study from previous studies on corruption in the banking sector is that it
fills the gap in the literature on the other side (i.e. bank deposit generation) of financial
intermediation by examining the influence of corrupt deposit liabilities on the going concern
of the banking institution.
The study asserts that the banks thrive on profit from corrupt deposit liabilities obtained
from individual members of the society in the short run but in the long run; such deposit will
hurt the banks future going concern and decline bank profitability for as much as 17 per
cent. This finding supports Arshad and Rizvi (2013) conclusion that corruption has a
significant positive impact on the bank’s profitability but only in the short run in the case of
Nigeria. This implies that as the banking institution thrives on corrupt deposits in the short
run, the profitability will be short-lived, bringing about bank distress, which will result
eventually in bank failure and by implication retard economic growth of the country. Fraud
committed by bank management and staff against the bank retards the profitability of the
bank by 6.6 and 98 per cent in the short run and long run, respectively. This implies that
Table VIII.
Diagnostic checks
Test carried out Jarque–Bera value Obs.*R2 Probability
Normality 14.07715 – 0.18188
Serial correlation – 81.63670 0.86421





fraud perpetrated in the banking sector can erode the profitability of the bank in the long
run. This finding negates the findings of Okereke and Kurotamunobaraomi (2016) that
corruption in deposit money bank in Nigeria does not significantly impede Nigeria’s
economic growth. The failure of the banking sector of any nation has a significant
implication on the stability and growth of the economy.
It is important to note that when banks stick to their legitimate business of giving out
loan and advances, the bank profitability grows by 123 and 142 per cent in the short run and
Table IX.
Causality result
Null hypothesis F-statistic Prob. Direction of causality
BTA does not Granger Cause NII 0.11480 0.8917 Independence
NII does not Granger Cause BTA 0.47454 0.6237
COR_DD does not Granger Cause NII 0.92167 0.4015 Independence
NII does not Granger Cause COR_DD 0.43293 0.6499
COR_SD does not Granger Cause NII 0.73515 0.4822 Independence
NII does not Granger Cause COR_SD 0.23273 0.7928
COR_TD does not Granger Cause NII 8.76588 0.0003 Bi-directional
NII does not Granger Cause COR_FD 14.5621 3.E-06
BTLA does not Granger Cause NII 4.56092 0.0129 Bi-directional
NII does not Granger Cause BTLA 4.73283 0.0110
TFA does not Granger Cause NII 0.78794 0.4578 Independence
NII does not Granger Cause TFA 0.33225 0.7182
COR_DD does not Granger Cause BTA 0.08198 0.9214 Independence
BTA does not Granger Cause COR_DD 0.19785 0.8208
COR_SD does not Granger Cause BTA 0.08431 0.9192 Independence
BTA does not Granger Cause COR_SD 0.08971 0.9143
COR_TD does not Granger Cause BTA 0.20397 0.8159 Independence
BTA does not Granger Cause COR_FD 0.97076 0.3826
BTLA does not Granger Cause BTA 0.31797 0.7284 Independence
BTA does not Granger Cause BTLA 0.12775 0.8802
TFA does not Granger Cause BTA 0.05742 0.9442 Independence
BTA does not Granger Cause TFA 0.29634 0.7442
COR_SD does not Granger Cause COR_DD 2.94406 0.0576 Bi-directional
COR_DD does not Granger Cause COR_SD 13.3838 8.E-06
COR_FD does not Granger Cause COR_DD 1.03605 0.3589 Independence
COR_DD does not Granger Cause COR_FD 0.76754 0.4671
BTLA does not Granger Cause COR_DD 0.42564 0.6546 Independence
COR_DD does not Granger Cause BTLA 0.71898 0.4899
TFA does not Granger Cause COR_DD 1.19021 0.3087 Independence
COR_DD does not Granger Cause TFA 0.70547 0.4965
COR_FD does not Granger Cause COR_SD 0.53850 0.5854 Independence
COR_SD does not Granger Cause COR_FD 0.58961 0.5566
BTLA does not Granger Cause COR_SD 0.21984 0.8031 Independence
COR_SD does not Granger Cause BTLA 0.58714 0.5580
TFA does not Granger Cause COR_SD 0.22539 0.7986 Independence
COR_SD does not Granger Cause TFA 0.34503 0.7091
BTLA does not Granger Cause COR_FD 7.79890 0.0007 Bi-directional
COR_FD does not Granger Cause BTLA 4.79623 0.0104
TFA does not Granger Cause COR_FD 0.99627 0.3732 Independence
COR_FD does not Granger Cause TFA 0.92556 0.3999
TFA does not Granger Cause BTLA 0.74415 0.4779 Independence





the long run, respectively. As the banks accumulate legitimate asset, the bank profit also
grows by 117 and 138 per cent in the short run and the long run, respectively, which means
that by concentrating on their legitimate business, bank earnings grow faster both in the
short run and in the long run.
From these results, policy-makers and regulators must strengthen anti-graft measures in
the bank to ensure that illicit funds do not find their way into the banking sector, as these
funds have a negative impact on the long-run profitability of the banks. The banking
institutions must resist every temptation to bring in corrupt deposits into the banking sector
because of its future implication.
The study fills the gap in the literature on the role of deposit money banks on corruption
by providing empirical evidence on the implication of corrupt deposit liabilities on future
stability and going concern of banking institutions in Nigeria.
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